Abstract
Introduction
Multisignature scheme allows different signers signing the same document, a multisignature of roughly the same size as a standard signature. A verifier is convinced that each signer participated in signing by transmitting a multi-signature instead of individual signatures, multi-signature schemes can greatly save on communication costs. Multisignatures were first introduced by Itakura and Nakamura [1] and have been the topic of muchresearch [2] [3] [4] . Micali, Ohta and Reyzin [5] gave the first strong notion of security of multisignatures. Boldyreva [4] gave a variant of Micali-Ohta-Reyzin model. It is more general and solved the open problemstated [5] . Moreover, the scheme of Boldyreva is the first non-interactive.
Mihir Bellare and Gregory Neven [6] study an identity based multi-signature scheme from RSA. Craig and Zulfikar Ramzan [7] also study an identity-based multi-signature scheme. Multisignatures is related to the aggregate signature. Boneh,Gentry,Lynn and Shacham [8] defined an aggregate signature scheme. Unlike multi-signature, aggregate signature aggregate signature scheme provides a method to aggregate signature by signature on different messages. Alexandra Boldyreva et al. [9] propose a new primitive that they call ordered multi-signatures (OMS) and a formal security model for ordered multi-signatures. The ordered multisignaturesproduces a compact (sontant-size). Multi-signatures, uses constantsize keys, is sequential in that signers sign one after another and no further interaction among the signers is rquired and ensures authenticity of both the signing order and that of message [9] . They gave some potential applications of ordered multi-signatures scheme in more detail.
Comparing to the struct signers [10] ,the ordered multi-signatures scheme in [9] is in the noninteractive setting. Provable security is the basic requirement for signature schemes. Alexandra Boldyreva et al. [9] proved ordered multisignature scheme secure in the random oracle model [11] . Commitment scheme is a basic building block and has diverse applications A signature scheme consists of the following three oracle model. Algorithms is a key generation, signature generation algorithm sign and a signature verification algorithm Verify [14] . Key Gen, which on input 1 k , where k is the security parameter, outputs a pair (
of matching public and private keys. Algorithm Key Gen is probabilistic, which receives a message m and the private key k s , and outputs a signature
The signing algorithm might be probabilistic. Verify, which receives a candidate signature , a message m and a public key Existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [15] , has become the standard notion of signature security. The security model of existential unforgeability (in the random oracle model) is defined using the following game between a challenger and an adversary [16] .
Security Model
Setup: The challenger runs algorithm key obtain to a public We say that G is a bilinear group if it satisfies these requirements.
The Waters Signature Scheme
The messages will be assumed to be bit strings of the form   Pick a random r  Rp Z and compute
The signature is 2 12 (
G , the message m as a bitstring:
 as 2 12 ( , ) G   . Verify that:
This signature is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack if the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem [13] in bilinear groups is hard.
Ordered Multisignature Schemes and their Security
An ordered multi-signature scheme (OMS) consists of the following four algorithms [31] . A parameter generation algorithm Opg that returns some global information I for the scheme. This algorithm can be run by a trusted third-party or standards bodies. A key generation algorithm Okg run by a user that on the input global information I returns a publicprivate keypair (  . The security model of OMS in [6] extends the notion of security for multi-signatures in [8] to also ensure authenticity of the signing order. Similarly to the model of [8] , the users are required to prove knowledge of their secret keys during public-key registration with a CA. For simplicity, this is modeled by requiring an adversary to hand over secret keys of malicious signers. This is known as theregistered-key or certified-key model. The security model of existential unforgeability for OMS is defined using the following game associated to OMS and a forger A with access to an oracle. The game runs in three stages [11] :
The game first runs Opg to obtain output I and then generates a challenge key-pair (pk, sk) by running Okg on input I [13] . Attack: A runs on inputs I, pk. A may query a key registration oracle with a key-pair ( , ) pk sk  and coins c used for key generation , which records pk registered if Okg(I,c)  ( , ) pk sk  (This is a simplified model of a possibly more- 
The message n*, and a purported OMS signature . This output is considered to be a forgery if it holds that [11] .
1) OVf (L*, n*, 
The Proposed Scheme
We construct an ordered multi-signature WOMS from the Waters signature. Our scheme is defined by the following algorithms shown in Figure 1 . The messages will be assumed to be 
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The signature is 
If so, output valid ; if not, output
 . An ordered multisignature in our scheme has the form
Correctness: It is easy to see that the verification equation is satisfied:
The equation above ensures authenticity of the signing order.
The Security Proof
The security analysis of our scheme is similar to the analysis presented in [13] . Theorem: The WOMS is (t, 
The OMS on message m under keys
Output: Eventually, A halts, outputting a forgery  *= (S*, R*, T*), a message.
and a list of public keys Now, Algorithm B computes
The private key corresponding to each public key in L* , B can knows it by the certification procedure. We have e( 1  ,g) 
Conclusions
A PHCBC in two rounds from any one-way permutation is a negation of the result.
 protocol is our main tool to construct PHCBC.  protocol is a three-move interactive protocol between the prove and the verifier in which the verifier is only required to send random bits as a challenge to the prove. Based on  protocol, a new method to construct a commitment scheme was proposed. In this paper, we will use  -protocol on HamiltonianCycle to construct PHCBC in constant rounds from any one-way permutation. In this paper we gave an ordered multisignature scheme which is provably secure without random oracles. Our construction derives from the waters signature scheme. It is also an interesting problem to find an ordered aggregate signature scheme provable secure without random oracles. and the experiment proves that this scheme is a good scheme suitable for the practical application with high computing efficiency.
